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Abstract: After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, democratic Zeitgeist swept the globe. International 
law seemed no longer indifferent to how domestic regimes were 
formed. Part of this post-1989 development was a considerable in-
crease in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
concerning the right to political participation as well as a prolifera-
tion of election observation missions by the OSCE/ODIHR. Both 
developed and implemented international standards for domestic 
electoral processes with increasing effectiveness. The dynamism 
inherent in this phenomenon of «international law going domes-
tic in electoral matters» raises legitimacy questions insofar as the 
original state consent –the main source of legitimacy in traditional 
international law– appears to be an insufficient basis for the broad 
exercise of the international institutions’ authority. Accordingly, 
this paper proposes a wider approach to examining the phenom-
enon. Through source, procedure, and result-oriented elements 
of legitimacy, it assesses and compares the development and im-
plementation of international electoral standards in the regional 
context of Europe.
Key words: Electoral Standards; Legitimacy; Right to Political Par-
ticipation; European Court of Human Rights; Election Observation.
Resumen: Con el final de la guerra fría, en 1989, el derecho inter-
nacional comenzó a mostrar un mayor interés por la conformación 
democrática de los regímenes nacionales. Se constata un aumento 
de la jurisprudencia de la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos dedi-
cada al derecho de participación política y una notable proliferación 
de las misiones de observación electoral por parte de la OSCE/
ODIHR. Ambas instituciones han acabado por desarrollar e imple-
mentar estándares internacionales para las elecciones nacionales 
con una efectividad constatada. Sin embargo, el dinamismo con-
sustancial a este fenómeno de «intervención ius internacionalista 
en cuestiones electorales nacionales» ha derivado en problemas de 
legitimación, en el entendido de que el originario consentimiento del 
Estado –principal fuente de legitimación del tradicional derecho in-
ternacional– parece constituir una base insuficiente para el ejercicio 
de la autoridad de las citadas instituciones internacionales. Justa-
mente por ello, este estudio se ha propuesto analizar este fenómeno 
de manera más amplia. Mediante el estudio de las fuentes, de los 
procedimientos y de los argumentos orientados al resultado, se pro-
cederá a analizar y a comparar el desarrollo y la implementación de 
los estándares electorales internacionales desde el punto de vista de 
su legitimidad en el contexto regional europeo.
Palabras clave: estándares electorales; legitimidad; derecho de 
participación política, Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos, ob-
servación electoral.
Sumario: 1. INTRODUCTION. 2. INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL STANDARDS POST-1989. 2.1 Normative background: democratic entitle-
ment in international law. 2.2. Development and implementation of international electoral standards in Europe. 2.3. Appreciation. 3. LE-
GITIMACy PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL STANDARDS: A COMPARISON. 3.1. Procedural legitimacy. 3.2. Substantive/
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1. introduction
A fter the end of the cold War and the collapse of the soviet union democratic Zeitgeist swept the globe. 1 international law seems no longer indifferent to the way a regime is formed and an emerging 
right to democratic entitlement is perceivable. this comes along with an 
increased development and implementation of international electoral stand-
ards.
the phenomenon of «international law going domestic» in electoral 
matters post-1989 is symptomatic for a growing expansion of international 
law into the internal ambit of states which also has taken place in other areas, 
such as environmental and economic law. 2 one aspect of this extension into 
the domestic realm is that international law increasingly addresses not only 
states but also non-state actors. 3 it likewise is accompanied by the growing 
authority of international institutions, 4 which increasingly have developed a 
life of their own, drawing on the competences attributed to them in their 
founding documents.
these developments imply new demands to justify the rule of interna-
tional law. in legitimacy terms –with legitimacy being understood as «a quality 
that leads people (or states) to accept authority– independent of coercion, self-
interest, or rational persuasion –because of a general sense that the authority 
 1 l. diamond/M. plattner et al., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. Themes and Perspectives 
(1997).
 2 see d. Bodansky, «the legitimacy of international Governance: a coming challenge for 
international environmental law», 93 American Journal of International Law (1999) 596; r. 
Wolfrum, «legitimacy of international law from a legal perspective: some introductory 
considerations», in r. Wolfrum/v. röben (eds.), Legitimacy of International Law (2008) 1, 12; 
see also J.h.h. Weiler, «the Geology of international law – Governance, democracy and 
legitimacy», 64 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2004) 547; a.M. 
slaughter, W. Burke-White, «the Future of international law is domestic. (or ‘the euro-
pean Way of law’)», 47 Harvard International Law Journal (2006) 327.
 3 W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (1964) 60 et seq; c. tomuschat, «in-
ternational law: ensuring the survival of Mankind on the eve of a new century», 281 Recueil 
des Cours (2001) 13, 70. see generally M. Kumm, «the legitimacy of international law: a 
constitutionalist Framework of analysis», 15 European Journal of International Law (2004) 907.
 4 For a definition of the exercise of international public authority, see a. von Bogdandy, p. 
dann, M. Goldmann, «developing the publicness of public international law: towards a le-
gal Framework for Global Governance activities», in a. von Bogdandy/r. Wolfrum/J. von 
Bernstorff/p. dann/M. Goldmann (eds.), The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institu-
tions. Advancing International Institutional Law (2009) 3, 11 et seq.
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is justified» 5– it raises the question as to the basis on which the operation of 
international law is accepted by its addressees.
in traditional international law, in the Westphalian system, state con-
sent and legality were considered largely sufficient bases for the acceptance 
of the rule of international law. as international law was traditionally per-
ceived as law between states, sovereign states mutually bound each other when 
consenting to international obligations. 6 to the extent that states subjected 
themselves to the authority of international institutions, legality played a fur-
ther legitimating role as it connected the institutions’ continuing authority to 
their original basis in state consent. 7 however, these traditional justifications 
seem increasingly insufficient in view of the phenomenon of «international 
law going domestic» with different addressees, i.e. non-state actors, than those 
which consented, and an increasingly active role of international institutions. 8
the insufficiency of state consent and legality characterises also devel-
opment and implementation of international electoral standards by interna-
tional human rights monitoring organs, especially regional courts (the eu-
ropean court of human rights (ecthr) and the inter-american court of 
human rights 9), as well as by international organisations conducting election 
observation missions. their dynamism makes it difficult to firmly ground the 
international institutions’ action in the original state consent through its par-
ticipation in human rights treaties and the invitation of election observation 
 5 see e.g. Bodansky, supra n. 2, 600. For similar views on legitimacy as justification of authority 
see Wolfrum, supra n. 2; d. Bodansky, «legitimacy», in e. hey, J. Brunnée and d. Bodansky 
(eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (2007) 704. see also J. delbrück, 
«exercising public authority beyond the state: transnational democracy and/or alternative 
legitimation strategies?», 10 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (2003) 29. 
 6 the separation between domestic and international law, as affirmed by Krisch/Kingsbury, has 
long been a means for limiting legitimacy demands on international law. (see n. Krisch/B. 
Kingsbury, «introduction: Global Governance and Global administrative law in the interna-
tional legal order», 17 European Journal of International Law (2006) 1, 11). see also B. Kings-
bury, «sovereignty and inequality», 9 European Journal of International Law (1998) 599.  
 7 see e.g. Bodansky, supra n. 5, 712.
 8 see Bodansky, supra n. 2, 596 et seq., 610. see also r. Wolfrum, «legitimacy of international 
law and the exercise of administrative Functions: the example of the international seabed 
authority, the international Maritime organization (iMo) and international Fisheries organi-
zations», 9 German Law Journal (2008) 2041, 2044. 
 9 see e.g. int.-american court of human rights, Yatama vs. Nicaragua, Judgment, 23 June 2005, 
serie c, no 127. see a. aguiar, El Derecho a la DEMOCRACIA. La Democracia en el Derecho y 
la Jurisprudencia Interamericanos. La Libertad de Expresión; Piedra Angular de la Democracia (2008) 
125, 355 et seq. for further reference.
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missions. this seems particularly sensitive as both institutions touch upon 
the very core of a state’s functioning with potentially far-reaching impact: the 
electoral arrangements in its constitutional order.
thus, additional ways to explain and assess the exercise of their author-
ity are warranted. put differently, it seems necessary to examine whether the 
development and implementation of international electoral standards may be 
considered legitimate for other reasons than the basis in state consent and 
legality. in fact, in addition to legitimacy derived from source –state consent– 
further dimensions of legitimacy were proposed in literature to justify the 
exercise of international authority. among these are procedural and outcome-
oriented/substantive aspects of legitimacy. 10 this paper proposes to examine 
and compare the development and implementation of international electoral 
standards in both strands of law 11 from these additional legitimacy perspec-
tives. 12 such investigation seems particularly promising given the parallel and 
largely unrelated development of standards in international human rights law 
and the election observation practice of international organisations, making 
them good test cases for «international law going domestic» in the same field 
but by different means.
accordingly, in the following, we will start with a brief overview of the 
emerging right to democratic entitlement in international law. We will then 
give an appraisal of electoral standards in the european regional context 
by examining the jurisprudence of the ecthr and the election observa-
tion practice of the office for democratic institutions and human rights 
(odihr) of the organisation for security and cooperation in europe 
(osce). 13 it will be argued that state consent, by ratification of the eu-
ropean convention on human rights (echr) and the invitation of elec-
tion observation missions in the 1990 copenhagen document, is a rather 
10 see Bodansky, supra n. 2; Wolfrum, supra n. 8; Bodansky supra n. 5 for further reference; see 
also t. treves, «aspects of legitimacy of decisions of international courts and tribunals», in 
r. Wolfrum/v. röben (eds.), Legitimacy in International Law (2008) 169. For a not merely inter-
national law perspective on legitimacy, see s. Bernstein, «legitimacy in Global environmental 
Governance», 1 Journal of International Law and International Relations 2004-2005, 139.
11 «law» is broadly defined, also including soft law standards.
12 it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine further legitimation strategies discussed in litera-
ture, such as concepts of transnational democracy. For further reference see e.g. delbrück, supra 
n. 5, 34 et seq; Kumm, supra n. 3.
13 the region of the osce geographically exceeds europe as its 56 participating states comprise 
also north american and central asian states. 
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thin basis for the development and implementation of international elec-
toral standards by the ecthr and odihr, especially given the potential 
impact of their findings (part two). that is why in part three additional 
procedural and outcome-related legitimacy dimensions will be used to assess 
and compare the development and implementation of international electoral 
standards in both strands of law. part Four concludes.
2. international electoral standards post-1989
the development of international electoral standards after the end of the 
cold War took place in the context of a growing international concern for 
democratic governance at the national level. the following section will thus 
first give a general overview of changes concerning democratic entitlement 
in international law post 1989 (2.1.) to then scrutinize the development and 
implementation of international electoral standards in europe (2.2.).
2.1. Normative background: democratic entitlement in international law
the emerging right to democratic entitlement in customary interna-
tional law is a recent phenomenon. For many years, international law was 
perceived as being strictly neutral towards domestic constitutional orders, es-
pecially with regard to how national governments are formed. 14 in 1986, in its 
famous Nicaragua decision, the international court of Justice still seemed to 
affirm the «blindness» of international law towards the domestic structure of 
state power, i.e., the form of government in a given state, stating: «however 
the regime in nicaragua be defined, adherence by a state to any particular 
doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary international law.» 15 as 
James crawford emphasized, «the court’s negative reaction even to the idea 
that nicaragua was subject to international supervision or accountability in 
14 early attempts to introduce the notion of «legitimacy» as a criterion for the recognition of 
governments under international law include the 1907 Tobar-doctrine in latin america. still, it 
had no lasting effect in international practice. 
15 see icJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
vs. United States), Judgment, 27 June 1986, ICJ Reps. 1986, 98, 133. 
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the conduct of elections reflects the emphasis of traditional international law 
on non-intervention in the internal affairs of states.» 16
the major human rights instruments vaguely frame the right to politi-
cal participation at both universal and regional levels, using terms such as 
«genuine periodic elections» or «guaranteeing the free expression of the will 
of the electors». 17 What is more, the provisions on political rights were not 
seriously adjudicated until the wave of democratizations after the end of the 
cold War 18. in fact, they were rarely relied upon before 1989. the ecthr, 
for instance, did not issue its first judgment concerning the right to free elec-
tions until 1987. 19 likewise, there was little election observation or monitor-
ing prior to 1989, and that was mainly in the process of decolonization: the 
un supervised plebiscites, independence referenda and elections in about 30 
non-self-governing territories between 1956 and 1989 20.
this lack of international concern for domestic electoral processes 
changed dramatically after the end of the cold War. the successor states of 
the soviet union, especially those in central and eastern europe, largely 
chose democracy as their form of government, democratically elected regimes 
replaced military dictatorships in latin america, and democratic reforms 
took place in various parts of africa. recent state practice as well as law and 
practice of international organizations clearly indicate that international law 
is no longer indifferent to the character of regimes exercising effective control 
within national borders 21.
16 J. crawford, «democracy and international law», 64 British Yearbook of International Law (1993) 
113, 121. see c. pippan, «international law, domestic political orders and the «democratic 
imperative»: has democracy Finally emerged as a Global legal entitlement?», Jean Monnet 
Working paper no 2/10 (new York, 2010), http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/pa-
pers10.html, 23 for further reference. 
17 art. 25 ccpr (1966); see also the similar provisions of art. 23 achr (1969); art. 13 Banjul 
charter (1981) and the weaker framed right to free elections of art. 3 of the 1st p to the echr 
(1952). on the general indeterminacy of political rights see M. nowak, UN Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. CCPR Commentary (2nd ed., 2005) 562, 590. see furthermore G. Fox, «the 
right to political participation in international law», in G. Fox/B. roth (eds.), Democratic Gov-
ernance and International Law (2000) 48; h. steiner, «political participation as a human right», 
Harvard Human Rights Yearbook (1988) 77, 131.
18 see Fox, supra 17, 69.
19 ecthr, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt vs. Belgium, 2 March 1987, a 113 (1987).
20 see c. Binder/c.pippan, «election Monitoring, international», in r. Wolfrum (ed.), Encyclope-
dia of Public International Law (2nd ed., 2008), http://www.mpepil.com/, para 8. 
21 G. Fox/B. roth, «introduction: the spread of liberal democracy and its implications for inter-
national law», in G. Fox/B.roth (eds.), Democratic Governance and International Law (2000) 1, 2.
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From an international law perspective, thomas Franck referred already 
in 1992 to an «emerging right to democratic governance». 22 niels petersen, 
in 2008, slightly reframed Franck’s proposition and identified a «right to the 
emergence of democratic governance» 23. petersen thus developed a principle 
of democratic teleology, in accordance with which states would be obligated 
to develop towards democracy, consolidate democratic institutions and pre-
vent regressions in the process of democratization 24.
these studies on an emerging right to democratic governance evidence 
a growing trend of «international law going domestic» in terms of national 
governance 25 post-1989 and depict the normative background of this analysis. 
still, the development and implementation of international electoral standards 
is not directly dependent on the existence of such right, as they are grounded 
in states’ participation in human rights treaties and the invitation of election 
observation missions. 26 on this basis, we will now proceed to examine how 
«international law has gone domestic» in the regional context of europe, with 
special focus on the jurisprudence of the ecthr and odihr’s election ob-
servation practice.
22 t. Franck, «the emerging right to democratic Governance», 86 American Journal of Interna-
tional Law (1992) 46. 
23 n. petersen, «the principle of democratic teleology in international law», 34 Brooklyn Jour-
nal of International Law (2008) 33, 84. J. d’asprémont, L’État Non Démocratique en Droit Interna-
tional. Étude Critique du Droit International Positif et de la Pratique Contemporaine (2008); see also 
c. pippan, «Gibt es ein recht auf demokratie im völkerrecht?», in e. riefler (ed.), Popper und 
die Menschenrechte (2007) 119. For the regional context of europe, see s. Wheatley, «democracy 
in international law: a european perspective», 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
(2002) 225. 
24 n. petersen, Demokratie als teleologisches Prinzip. Zur Legitimität von Staatsgewalt im Völkerrecht 
(2009) 2, 21 et seq, 49. the principle, according to petersen, however suffers indeterminacy and 
is process-oriented. 
25 For critics of such right to democratic entitlement see d. schindler, «völkerrecht und demokra-
tie», in G. hafner et al. (eds.), Liber Amicorum Professor Seidl-Hohenveldern (1998) 611; B. Bauer, 
Der völkerrechtliche Anspruch auf Demokratie (1998); t. carothers, «empirical perspectives on 
the emerging norm of democratic Governance», ASIL Proceedings (1992) 261; see also M. 
Koskenniemi, «Whose intolerance, which democracy?» in G. Fox/B.roth (eds.), Democratic 
Governance and International Law (2000) 436.
26 see n. petersen, supra n. 24, 106. 
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2.2.  Development and implementation of international electoral standards 
in Europe
the ecthr, in its interpretation of the right to free elections, and 
odihr election observation missions have adopted an increasingly pro-
active stand in electoral matters since the end of the cold War. notwith-
standing the institutions’ different focuses –the protection of individual rights 
(ecthr) and the overall assessment of the election process (odihr election 
observation missions)– both have engaged in a dynamic development and im-
plementation of electoral standards. First, both have developed electoral stand-
ards: the ecthr’s jurisprudence evolved and considerably broadened the 
scope of application of article 3 of the 1st protocol (p) to the echr in the 
over 40 cases which have been brought before the court since its first deci-
sion in 1987. 27 likewise, the more than 230 election observation missions de-
ployed so far 28 have applied and concretised the electoral commitments con-
tained in the 1990 copenhagen document 29, therewith generating soft law 
and best practices. second, both institutions have furthered compliance with 
and implementation of electoral standards: the ecthr by means of bind-
ing judgments on political rights, the execution of which is supervised by the 
committee of Ministers, and odihr election observation missions through 
political pressure exercised on states to conduct elections in accordance with 
international law through the publication of their observations as well as in 
the follow-up to an election.
also, as will be argued in the following, both institutions considerably 
draw on the competences originally attributed to them in their founding doc-
uments (echr and its protocols; osce documents) in their dynamic devel-
opment and implementation of electoral standards.
27 see d.J. harris/M.o’Boyle/e.p.Bates/c.M.Buckley, Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick. Law of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights (2nd ed., 2009) 711. see also s. Golubok, «right to Free 
elections: emerging Guarantees or two layers of protection?», in 27 Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights (2009) 361.
28 osce/odihr, Election Observation Handbook (6th ed., 2010) 8. While the formats of election 
observation missions differ, the following assessment will be based on a «standardized» mis-
sion.
29 document of the copenhagen Meeting of the conference on the human dimension of the 
csce, 29 June 1990, http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/1990/06/13992_en.pdf. 
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2.2.1. Jurisprudence of the european court of human rights (ecthr)
to firmly base the ecthr’s evolutionary jurisprudence on the right to 
free elections in article 3 of the 1st p to the echr is, at first, hampered by 
the indeterminate wording of the provision which reflects the controversial 
incorporation of political rights in the convention. 30 in fact, some experts 
questioned during drafting whether «issues of constitutional and political 
character» should be included at all in the echr. in the end, the right to 
free elections was enshrined in article 3 of the 1st p to the echr which was 
adopted in 1952. 31 still, the weak wording of the provision is remarkable: 32 
instead of granting individual rights, article 3 merely provides for state obli-
gations, requiring state parties to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by 
secret ballot. 33
the ecthr’s early case law on political rights reflects the provision’s 
weak wording. the court exercised considerable self-restraint, left a broad 
margin of appreciation to states, and merely controlled whether the essence of 
the right was violated in combination with a check whether the interference of 
the state was disproportionate or arbitrary. 34 in its more recent jurisprudence, 
though, the court has adopted a more affirmative approach, 35 subjecting the 
respective states’ electoral frameworks to ever closer scrutiny. With many of 
the cases concerning the right to stand for elections, the court adopted an in-
creasingly tight proportionality test, weighing the individual interests at stake 
against the respective state interest in a measure. 36 in its evolutionary inter-
30 see s. Marks, «the european convention on human rights and its ‘democratic society’», 56 
British Yearbook of International Law (1995) 209, 221.
31 213 unts 262; ets 9; adopted 1952, entry in force 1954. With 45 parties, the 1st p to the 
echr is ratified by all council of europe member states except switzerland and Monaco. sta-
tus of ratifications as of august 2011, http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/commun/cherchesig.
asp?nt=009&cM=7&dF=11/09/2011&cl=enG.
32 the travaux preparatoires are unclear as to whether the states intended to create an enforceable 
right to free elections or rather stipulate a general –if unenforceable– obligation upon states to 
maintain democratic structures. (see Marks, supra n. 30, 221).
33 art 3 of the 1st p: «the high contracting parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable 
intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion 
of the people in the choice of their legislature.»
34 see e.g. Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt vs. Belgium, supra n. 19, para. 52. the decisions of the 
ecthr are available at: http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp.
35 see harris et al., supra n. 27.
36 see for instance the following three recent cases which were decided by the ecthr: Zdanoka 
vs. Latvia (16 March 2006), Adamsons vs. Latvia (24 June 2008) and Tanase vs. Moldova (27 april 
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pretation of article 3 of the 1st p to the echr, the court considerably broad-
ened the provision’s scope. 37 the court reasoned this development of elec-
toral standards by comparing, among others, the legal systems of the council 
of europe’s member states to scrutinize whether a new european standard 
had emerged. 38 What is more, in two recent cases on prisoners’ voting rights, 
Hirst vs UK (2005) 39 and Frodl vs Austria 40 (2010), the ecthr resorted to an 
even more extensive interpretation of article 3. notwithstanding that legis-
lation in the state parties to the echr on the matter was not uniform –the 
basis for a dynamic interpretation of the echr as a living instrument– 41 the 
court found that the ex lege deprivation of the prisoners’ voting rights in both 
countries constituted a breach of article 3. 42
the court’s dynamic development of electoral standards evidences a cer-
tain tension with its mandate to interpret and apply the echr and its proto-
cols 43 in order to ensure the compliance with the state parties’ obligations 44: 
the court engaged in a development of electoral standards, which in some 
instances was not even based on a common european standard, especially in 
the cases on prisoners’ voting rights. in fact, the court’s majority view in Hirst 
was criticized in a joint dissenting opinion by eminent judges such as Wild-
haber and costa, affirming that «the court [was] not a legislator and should 
2010). For an extensive appraisal of the court’s jurisprudence on the right to free elections see 
harris et al., supra n. 27.
37 such interpretation considers the echr (including its protocols) as «a living instrument 
which... must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions» provided that a right has 
found sufficiently wide acceptance among member states as to affect the meaning of the con-
vention. (see e.g. ecthr, Tyrer vs. UK, 25 april 1978, serie a). For further reference see harris 
et al., supra n. 27, 7 et seq.
38 see e.g. ecthr, Tanase vs. Moldova, supra n. 36, paras. 87 et seq.
39 ecthr, Hirst vs. The United Kingdom, 6 october 2005; see also the ecthr’s pilot judgment 
Greens and M.T. vs. UK where the ecthr reiterated its findings of Hirst (ecthr, Greens and 
M.T. vs. UK, 23 november 2010, paras. 77 et seq.).
40 ecthr, Frodl vs. Austria, 8 april 2010.
41 see Joint dissenting opinion of the Judges Wildhaber, costa, lorenzen, Kovler and Jebens to 
Hirst vs. UK, para. 6.
42 likewise in Hirst, the ecthr aimed at identifying «common european standards». problem-
atically, the court disregarded though that only 18 out of 45 contracting states had no restric-
tions on prisoners’ voting rights. (see criticism in Joint dissenting opinion to Hirst, id., para. 6; 
see generally Hirst vs. UK, supra n. 39, paras. 33 et seq.). 
43 art. 32 echr.
44 art. 19 echr.
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be careful not to assume legislative functions». 45 such dynamic development 
of standards seems particularly delicate in the field of political rights which are 
intrinsically linked to a country’s electoral arrangements and domestic consti-
tutional dispensations.
2.2.2. osce/odihr election observation practice
it is likewise difficult to firmly base the development and implementation 
of international electoral standards through the odihr election observation 
practice firmly on state consent and the institution’s broad mandate.
the main basis for the conduct of odihr election observation missions 
is the standing invitation of osce participating states in paragraph 8 of the 
copenhagen document 46, which states in broad and general terms:
«the participating states consider that the presence of observers, both 
foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral process for states in which 
elections are taking place. they therefore invite observers from any other 
csce participating states... such observers will undertake not to interfere 
in the electoral proceedings.» 47
in general osce practice, no additional invitation is required for obser-
vation missions to be deployed to a specific election.
the commitments of osce participating states concerning the stand-
ards of domestic electoral processes, which are contained in the copenhagen 
document, include the principles of universal and equal suffrage, secrecy of 
vote, the necessity of free elections at reasonable intervals where the seats of 
at least one chamber of the national legislature are contested by popular vote, 
freely established political parties, the need to ensure campaigning in a free 
and fair atmosphere, and the essential unimpeded access to the media for all 
political groupings. 48 although osce documents do not constitute interna-
45 see criticism in the Joint dissenting opinion to Hirst, supra n. 41, paras. 6 and 9.
46 copenhagen document, supra n. 29. 
47 Id., para. 8. the commitment to receive observers was strengthened in subsequent summit reso-
lutions and outcome documents. (see infra n. 53 et seq.). 
48 copenhagen document, supra n. 29, para 7. see also the 1990 charter of paris. For a discussion 
see F. evers, «osce election observation. commitments, Methodology, criticism», 15 OSCE 
Yearbook 2009, 235, 236 et seq. 
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tional treaties in the classical and formal sense –in fact, their legal nature is still 
controversial– 49 they are based on the consensus of all osce participating 
states; 50 are aimed at producing strong commitments, at the very least; and are 
very effective. 51 odihr is the institution tasked with monitoring elections, 
having been «created by participating states to assist them in implementing 
their human dimension commitments, including those related to elections.» 52 
still, odihr’s concrete mandate and the actions it can undertake are de-
scribed vaguely: odihr is mandated to carry out «comprehensive election 
monitoring» 53 and to play an «enhanced role in election monitoring before, 
during and after the elections». 54 in the charter for european security, adopt-
ed at the osce istanbul summit in 1999, the participating states also com-
mitted themselves to follow up promptly on odihr’s recommendations. 55
Based on the standing invitation in the copenhagen and subsequent 
osce documents, odihr election observation missions analyse a country’s 
electoral process from different legal, electoral, political, and media perspec-
49 some scholars consider osce documents as international treaties without the classical state 
responsibility and jurisdiction (J. Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law (1996) 
126); others view them as soft law with binding political effect (u. Fastenrath, «the legal sig-
nificance of csce/osce documents», OSCE Yearbook 1995/1996, 411, 418; t. schweisfurth, 
«die juristische Mutation der KsZe», in u. Beyerlin (ed.): Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewah-
rung (1995) 213, 224); again others consider them to be strictly non-binding political com-
mitments (K. ipsen/v. epping, völkerrecht (5th ed., 2004) 529 et seq. see generally a. Farahat, 
«regulating Minority issues through standard setting and Mediation: the case of the high 
commissioner on national Minorities», in a. von Bogdandy/r. Wolfrum/J. von Bernstorff/p. 
dann/M. Goldmann (eds.), The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions. Advancing 
International Institutional Law (2009), 343, 346 for further reference.
50 according to röben, unanimity favours legitimacy. (v. röben, «What about hobbes? legiti-
macy as a Matter of inclusion in the Functional and rational exercise of international public 
power», in r. Wolfrum/v. röben (eds.), Legitimacy in International Law (2008) 353, 357 et seq.).
51 see a. Farahat for comparative findings on the high commissioner on national Minorities, 
supra n. 49.
52 eoM handbook, supra n. 28, 7. odihr was originally established as the office for Free elec-
tions by a decision taken at the 1990 paris summit of the csce, the osce’s predecessor.
53 Fourth Meeting of the csce council of Ministers, rome, 30 november 1993, «csce 
and the new europe – our security is indivisible», http://www.osce.org/documents/
mcs/1993/11/4165_en.pdf, para. iv.4. 
54 osce Budapest summit, «Budapest document 1994: towards a Genuine partnership in a 
new era», http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1994/12/4048_en.pdf, ch. viii, para. 12. see 
also clarifications brought by the decision 19/06 at the 2006 osce Ministerial council in 
Brussels, 5 december 2006, «strengthening the effectiveness of the osce», sec. 2, para. 13. 
55 osce istanbul summit, «istanbul document 1999: charter for european security», http://
www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1999/11/4050_en.pdf, para. 26. 
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tives. their assessment focuses not only on election day but also includes the 
pre- and post-electoral phase. the missions’ findings are published in state-
ments and reports, 56 which go into considerable detail, concretising the com-
mitments of the copenhagen document in their application to a specific 
election. 57 election reports also contain recommendations and guidelines of 
action for non-state actors such as political parties and the media. 58 the pub-
lication of the preliminary statement, in particular, immediately after elec-
tion day, which usually receives strong media attention, exercises consider-
able pressure on national authorities to conduct elections in accordance with 
international standards. 59
accordingly, odihr election observation missions exercise authority 
mainly by distributing information and through their judgment of an elec-
tion. 60 they provoke states quite effectively to implement electoral standards 
through their, in anne van aaken’s and richard chambers’ terms, «govern-
ance through information.» 61 While election observers focus on the techni-
calities of the process and are guided by the principles of impartiality and 
non-interference, they may (de-)legitimize governments through their obser-
vations. this is perhaps best exemplified with the so-called «colour revolu-
tions» in Georgia (2003), the ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005), where 
odihr observers’ criticisms gave credibility to the fraud allegations brought 
forward by the opposition, thus contributing to a regime change 62.
56 osce/odihr Website, http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/14207.html. 
57 evers refers to «practically implemented interpretive standards» which are developed as a result 
of interpretation and implementation by odihr and the participating states, «creating a kind 
of customary law in the process» (evers, supra n. 48, 236, 239). see section 3.2 infra for details. 
see also c. Binder, «international election observation by the osce and the human right to 
political participation», 13 European Public Law (2007) 133, 148 et seq. 
58 see e.g. odihr recommendations on the activities of the election administration, on voter ed-
ucation programmes or women’s and minority participation in the election observation reports. 
(Supra n. 56). see furthermore the requirement to disclose and report on campaign funds as well 
as the rules concerning campaigning in the media in osce/odihr, existing commitments 
for democratic elections in osce participating states, Warsaw (2003), http://www.osce.org/
odihr/publications.html?lsi=true&limit=10&grp=243, paras. 7.8, 7.13, 7.14.
59 see Binder, supra n. 57, 150. 
60 see a. van aaken/r. chambers, «accountability and independence of international election 
observers» 6 International Organizations Law Review (2009) 541.
61 Id., 28.
62 see e.g. M. Meyer-resende, «exporting legitimacy: the record of eu election observation 
in the context of eu democracy support», ceps Working document March 2006, 12. see 
also Binder, supra n. 57, 150.
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this potentially far-reaching impact of a mission’s assessment stands in 
certain contrast to the indeterminate bases of the observers’ activities, namely 
the vaguely framed invitation of election observers in the 1990 copenhagen 
document and odihr’s broad mandate. it is exacerbated by the fact that, 
politically, it is de facto impossible for osce participating states to withdraw 
the standing invitation of election observers given in the copenhagen docu-
ment. in fact, odihr’s activities were challenged within the osce. since 
2003/04 russia and other members of the commonwealth of independent 
states (cis) have consistently criticized odihr for applying «double stand-
ards» and exercising an «unchecked autonomy». 63
2.3. Appreciation
the above appraisal shows that both the ecthr and odihr election 
observation missions have developed and implemented international electoral 
standards post-1989 with increasing dynamism. in so doing, both institutions 
expanded the reign of international law and contributed to the fact that «in-
ternational law went domestic» in electoral matters in europe.
the actions of the ecthr and odihr have some basis in state con-
sent as the ecthr only exercises jurisdiction when a state has ratified the 
echr and its 1st p, and osce participating states have consented to receiv-
ing election observers in relevant osce documents. the original states’ 
consent, however, does not cover all aspects of the institutions’ actions. this 
may be explained by the indeterminacy of the applicable regulatory frame-
work (i.e. vague electoral standards, odihr’s broad mandate), which provide 
63 see e.g. the statement of the russian Foreign Minister: «...autonomy of the odihr has turned 
into a complete absence of control and decent governments cannot accept this; otherwise mem-
bers of the osce will also want to seek ‘autonomy’ from odihr.» (s. lavrov, Minister for 
Foreign affairs of the russian Federation, at the osce Ministerial council, ljubljana, 5-6 
december 2005, http://www.osce.org/conferences/mc_2005.html?page=documents&group=au
thor.) see also the Moscow declaration on the state of affairs in the osce, where odihr 
was accused of muddling through politicization. (Moscow declaration on the state of affairs 
in the osce, 8 July 2004, pc.del/630/04, a text endorsed by all cis states except Georgia, 
azerbaijan and turkmenistan). see generally v-Y Ghébali, «debating election and election 
Monitoring standards at the ocse: Between technical needs and politicization», 11 OSCE 
Yearbook 2005, 215.
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little guidance for the institutions’ activities. 64 Furthermore, the generality 
and continuous manner of the exercuse of, the institutions authority –the 
permanent jurisdiction of the ecthr and the standing invitation of observ-
ers– reduces the legitimating role of original consent, especially in view of 
both institutions’ activism. 65 the legality link is weakened since, as stated, the 
ecthr considerably broadened its standard of review in a wide interpreta-
tion of article 3 of the 1st p to the echr and likewise, the multiple activities 
of odihr election observers are only loosely grounded on odihr’s broad 
mandate and states’ general invitation of observers.
the broad exercise of both institutions’ authorities is particularly sensi-
tive in view of the potential far-reaching impact of their findings at domestic 
level. in fact, the ecthr’s judgments may impact on the electoral arrange-
ments of states, in matters such as voting rights for out-of-country citizens, 66 
the threshold of votes required to gain seats in parliament 67 or the right of 
former communists to stand for elections in countries emerging from com-
munist past. 68 as mentioned, odihr election observation missions may de-
legitimate governments through their assessments. thus, the activism of both 
institutions in electoral matters brought them into the somehow paradoxical 
situation to serve –through the implementation of electoral standards– the 
realisation of democratic self-rule, i.e., the emerging right to democratic en-
titlement mentioned before. this, however, at the prize of possible severe 
interventions in domestic legal orders.
64 the determinacy of a rule is, according to thomas Franck, vital for its perceived legitimacy as it 
is decisive for the degree to which its application will correspond to the original consent given. 
see t. Franck, «the power of legitimacy and the legitimacy of power: international law in 
an age of power disequilibrium», 100 American Journal of International Law (2006) 88, 94; see 
also t. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995) 30 et seq.
65 When considering the legitimating role of state consent, Bodansky distinguishes between spe-
cific consent to particular obligations or decisions (e.g., by ratifying a treaty with specific obliga-
tions or accepting a court’s jurisdiction to a specific case) and general consent to an ongoing 
system of governance, which, once set up, develops a legal life of its own (e.g., the general 
submission to the jurisdiction of a court; the ratification of the un charter with its permanent 
institutions). (Bodansky, supra n. 2, 604). see also Wolfrum, supra n. 8, 2042.
66 Sitaropoulos et al. vs. Greece, 8 July 2010.
67 in Yumak and Sadak vs. Turkey (8 July 2008) where the ecthr had to deal with the 10 percent 
threshold of votes required to gain a seat in the turkish parliament, the court did not establish 
a violation though. see Golubok on the significance of the ecthr examination of electoral 
systems. (Golubok, supra n. 27, 376 et seq.)
68 see Zdanoka vs. Latvia, supra n. 36, Adamsons vs. Latvia, supra n. 36. 
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in view of the prima facie insufficiency of source legitimacy as well as the 
potential impact of the institutions’ dynamism in electoral matters, a broader 
look into the legitimacy of their activities will be undertaken in the following 
section. Beyond state consent, how else can they be justified?
3. legitimacy perspectives on international 
electoral standards: a comparison
recalling the definition of legitimacy as «quality that leads people (or 
states) to accept authority –independent of coercion, self-interest, or rational 
persuasion– because of a general sense that the authority is justified», legiti-
macy not only is a general justification and requirement for the exercise of 
authority. 69 the strength of a norm perceived as legitimate lies also in the fact 
that it pulls, in thomas Franck’s terms, those to whom it is addressed towards 
consensual compliance. 70 this seems particularly crucial in international law, 
for which there are often no effective enforcement mechanisms.
confronted with the increasing insufficiency of state consent to justify 
the authority of international institutions, doctrinal interest in legitimacy has 
grown. 71 scholars have suggested different models and elements that may in-
duce legitimacy for the exercise of a particular authority. 72 they distinguished 
broadly between source, procedure, and result-oriented approaches, or a com-
bination thereof. 73 put differently, authority can be legitimated by its origin 
or source (traditionally state consent); it can also be considered as legitimate 
because it involves procedures which are adequate and fair or because of its 
success in producing desired outcomes. 74 Functional aspects, including the ex-
69 Bodansky situates legitimacy «somewhere between rational persuasion and compulsion» as a 
basis for action. (Bodansky, supra n. 5, 707).
70 t. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, 1990.
71 in addition to those already mentioned, see also Bodansky, supra n. 5. critical of legitimacy M. 
Koskenniemi, «legitimacy, rights and ideology: notes towards a critique of the new Moral 
internationalism», 7 Associations (2003) 349.
72 see e.g. Wolfrum, supra n. 8, 2040; Bodansky, supra n. 2, 611 et seq. as indicated supra n. 12, it 
is beyond the scope of this paper to refer to further legitimatory approaches such as concepts of 
transnational democracy. 
73 Wolfrum, supra n. 8, 2040; Bodansky, supra n. 2, 612. 
74 Id. see also delbrück, supra n. 5, 42.
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pertise of the respective institution or the existence of adequate accountability 
mechanisms, may also be taken into account. 75
the following part will draw on procedure- (3.1) and outcome- (3.2) 
related legitimacy dimensions to assess and compare the development and 
implementation of international electoral standards in both human rights law 
and election observation practice. due to space constraints, the discussion will 
remain rudimentary and only highlight the most relevant aspects. 76 it is done 
in the awareness that legitimacy is a matter not of all or nothing but of more 
or less.
3.1. Procedural legitimacy
as stated, authority can be legitimated because it involves procedures 
considered to be adequate and fair, 77 including the composition of the decid-
ing authority and the procedures guiding deliberation (decision-making).
to begin, the composition of both institutions lays a reasonable founda-
tion for an impartial and independent development and implementation of 
electoral standards. the ecthr benefits especially from its judicial character, 
with its judges enjoying the judicial guarantees of impartiality, independence, 
and legal expertise. 78 the involvement of the council of europe’s parliamen-
tary assembly in the (s)election of judges also provides for some democratic 
75 Bodansky distinguishes between legal legitimacy, participatory legitimacy, and expert legitima-
cy. (Id., 623). treves establishes detailed clusters to assess the legitimacy of judicial decisions, 
including the way the judicial body was established; concerning the members of the judicial 
bodies; the basis of jurisdiction; the way how judgments are reached; the characteristics of the 
decision; and the decision’s effects. (treves, supra n. 10, 171 et seq.).
76 likewise, it is beyond the scope of this paper to address the legitimacy of the underlying norms 
–the applicable electoral standards. this seems less problematic though, as states have generally 
consented through their ratification of the echr and its 1st p as well as in their adoption of the 
copenhagen document. For further reference see generally l. Fuller, The Morality of Law (2nd 
rev. ed. 1969); see also J. Brunnée and s. toope who, drawing on lon Fuller’s theory, propose 
internal morality based on criteria such as avoidance of contradiction, generality and congru-
ence with underlying rules. (see J. Brunnée/s. toope, «international law and constructivism: 
elements of an interactional theory of international law», 39 Columbian Journal of Transna-
tional Law (2000) 19).
77 see e.g. Wolfrum, supra n. 8, 2040.
78 arts. 21, 23.1 echr. the judges’ independence was further strengthened with the entry in 
force of protocol no. 14 in June 2010, which extended the terms of office to 9 years and abol-
ished the possibility of re-election.
Christina Binder
452 anuario español de derecho internacional / vol. 27 / 2011
vista anterior
legitimacy. 79 the requirements for independence and impartiality of odihr 
observers are less formalized. 80 still, a code of conduct, 81 which must be 
signed by all observers, obliges them to impartiality and enhances profession-
alism. 82 Furthermore, the members of the core team are independent experts 
with a high degree of technical expertise in electoral matters, which is gener-
ally considered a safeguard against politicization. 83 the core team is recruited 
in open competition from a variety of states. 84 Finally, the multinational com-
position of odihr election observation missions –observers come from all 
osce participating states, with not more than 10% of observers from one 
country, and nobody may observe elections in his own country– 85 favours a 
balanced observation.
turning to the procedures involved to reach a judgment, one may rough-
ly distinguish between procedural safeguards aiming at a decision’s normative 
correctness and the institutions’ capacities to reach factually comprehensive 
decisions. concerning the former, the ecthr finds legitimacy in its general 
fair trial requirements. 86 the court’s interpretative technique, basing its dy-
79 in accordance with art. 22 echr, the parliamentary assembly can elect on the basis of a list 
of 3 candidates nominated by a state. (see a. von Bogdandy/i. venzke, «in Whose name? an 
investigation of international courts’ public authority and its democratic Justification», 2010, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1593543, 37 et seq.). 
80 For a general overview, see J. Misk, «standardizing the principles of international election 
observation», 13 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 2010, 763.
81 declaration of principles for international election observation and code of conduct for in-
ternational election observers, 27 october 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/observer/dec-
laration_of_principles_code_of_conduct_en.pdf. 
82 see also venice commission, «Guidelines on the internationally recognized status for elec-
tion observers», cdl-ad(2009)059, strasbourg, 14 december 2009, http://www.venice.coe.
int/docs/2009/cdl-ad(2009)059-e.asp.
83 in favour of legitimacy by independent experts Wolfrum, taking the example of the legal and 
technical commission of the international seabed authority. (Wolfrum, supra n. 8, 2045). For 
critical views see M. Koskenniemi, «Global Governance and public international law», 37 
Kritische Justiz 2004, 241; J. Klabbers, «two concepts of international organization», 2 Inter-
national Organizations Law Review 2005, 277. For a differentiated view see Bodansky, supra n. 5, 
718 et seq.
84 some see still room to improve the transparency of the recruitment procedures. (see e.g. 
the osce Ministerial council decision 2006, supra n. 54. see also odihr’s reply: osce/
odihr, «common responsibility. commitments and implementation», november 2006, 51, 
http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2006/11/22321_761_en.pdf).
85 on the structure of election observation missions see election observation handbook, supra n. 
28, 37 et seq.
86 such as public hearings, art. 40 echr; see also the welcome possibility to allow for third party 
intervention in accordance with art. 36 echr.
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namic interpretation of article 3 of the 1st p to the echr on the detection of 
a common european standard, 87 seems –if applied properly and grounded in 
true european consensus which arguably was not the case in Hirst vs. UK– 88 
an adequate concretisation of the convention’s indeterminate provision on 
political rights: the coherent methodology favours consistency. likewise, the 
possible referral of cases raising serious legal questions of general interests 
to the Grand chamber 89 in second instance contributes to legitimacy, given 
the inclusive composition of the Grand chamber’s 17 sitting judges. several 
cases concerning political rights were Grand chamber decisions. 90 still, the 
legitimacy of such judgments is arguably reduced in cases of strong dissenting 
opinions, as was the case in Hirst vs. UK.
While the ecthr has strong procedural safeguards and methodological 
techniques to reach normatively correct decisions and this accordingly results 
in the development of legitimated electoral standards, its fact-finding possibil-
ities are limited. the court usually appreciates facts as established by national 
courts 91 on the basis of written applications by the parties, and, because it lacks 
resources, only most exceptionally engages in fact-finding or on-site visits it-
self. 92 in fact, it is simply beyond the capacities of an international judicial 
institution to obtain a comprehensive picture of a domestic election, notwith-
standing the welcome liberal practice of the ecthr concerning the admis-
sibility of amicus curiae, which provide additional insights into a country’s situ-
ation. 93 this may hamper the court’s capacity to resort to a comprehensive 
consideration of facts, especially given the complexity of electoral processes 
with a variety of stakeholders involved. Weighing individual interests against 
87 see e.g. Tanase vs. Moldova, supra n. 36, paras. 87 et seq; Hirst vs. UK, supra n. 39, paras. 33 et seq.; 
see the court’s comparative law approach also in Yumak and Sadak vs. Turkey, supra n. 67, paras. 
61 et seq. see generally supra, section 2.2.1.
88 Supra, section 2.2.1.
89 art. 43 echr.
90 see e.g. ecthr Hirst vs. UK, supra n. 39; ecthr, Zdanoka vs. Latvia, supra n. 36; Yumak and 
Sadak vs. Turkey, supra n. 87. 
91 While investigations ex officio are in principle possible in accordance with art. 38 echr, they 
are rarely effectuated.
92 see harris et al., supra n. 27, 846 et seq. for further reference. 
93 art. 44 of the rules of the court. (see id., 854 for further reference). For instance, in Hirst vs. 
UK two briefs were submitted by nGos in favour of prisoners’ voting rights. (Hirst vs. UK, su-
pra n. 39, paras. 53 et seq.). positive on the submission of amicus curiae briefs as means to increase 
the subjective legitimacy of findings: Wolfrum, supra n. 2, 7.
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relevant state interests may be prevented accordingly, as was shown, for in-
stance, in the court’s problematic decision Sukhovetskyy vs. Ukraine. 94 in the 
judgment, the court did not find a violation of the applicant’s political rights, 
notwithstanding that the disproportionately high deposit required to stand for 
elections arguably had impeded him from running. 95
the (procedural) safeguard ensuring the normative correctness and lack 
of bias of odihr election observation missions’ assessments is the institu-
tion’s elaborate and formalized methodology. 96 it is laid down in «observer 
handbooks» which provide detailed guidelines for election observation mis-
sions to undertake their work in a way that respects the principles of impar-
tiality and non-interference in the election process. in response to criticism, 
odihr has also diversified the range of countries to which observation mis-
sions are deployed, now observing elections not only in countries emerging 
from a non-democratic past but also –albeit at a smaller scale– in longer es-
tablished democracies. 97 as the missions’ reports are prepared in cooperation 
with odihr headquarters, the independence of odihr election observa-
tion missions from their «mother» organisation resides mainly in the fact 
that odihr is an independent institution within the osce. 98 however, the 
accountability mechanisms of election observation missions still are not suf-
ficiently formalized. 99 election observation missions’ most important asset is 
their extensive capacity for fact-finding, largely due to the long-term presence 
of observers throughout the country. election observation missions, there-
fore, base their findings on comprehensive observations that draw on contacts 
with all relevant electoral stakeholders (members of the election commission, 
political parties, representatives of civil society, etc.).
94 ecthr, Sukhovetskyy vs. Ukraine, 2006-vi, 44 EHRR 1185. 
95 For criticism of the judgment see harris et al., supra n. 27, 721.
96 see e.g. eoM handbook, supra n. 28; declaration of principles for international election ob-
servation, supra n. 81; see evers, supra n. 48, 243 et seq.; see also aaken/chambers, supra n. 60, 
551.
97 see evers, supra n. 48, 241 et seq. for details.
98 Id., 18. evers goes more into detail, specifying that odihr’s independence is based in osce 
documents tasking odihr with carrying out independent election observation as well as 
odihr’s constant affirmation of its own independence which was also accepted by the major-
ity of osce participating states, whereas according to osce rules of procedure, odihr was 
not a decision making body but an executive structure or osce institution. (Id., 244 et seq.).
99 aaken/chambers, supra n. 60, 570 et seq.
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3.2. Substantive/outcome legitimacy
substantive/outcome based legitimacy –most bluntly speaking– is con-
cerned with an institution’s «output», its doing «a good job in governing», 
which also relates to its effectiveness. 100 drawing on treves’ discussion of le-
gitimacy of judicial decisions, we will particularly address the inherent quali-
ties/characteristics of a decision (i.e., consistent application of relevant law and 
quality of legal reasoning) 101 and the relation between a decision and its im-
plementation (in more general terms to what extent the outcome is accepted 
by the respective community). 102 an examination of these dimensions follows.
When applying article 3 of the 1st p to the echr, the ecthr exten-
sively refers to its previous case law. 103 such references are welcome as they 
have the practical effect of system building by informal precedent, 104 further-
ing the consistency of the court’s judgments and stabilising normative ex-
pectations. 105 the court’s interpretational technique of comparing different 
states’ legal orders to inquire whether a new european standard on a matter 
has emerged –documented in the court’s considerations– furthers transpar-
ency. 106 the coherence of odihr election observation missions’ standard 
setting, inversely, is facilitated by the numerous missions deployed during the 
last 20 years. the missions have consistently concretised indeterminate elec-
toral standards in their interpretation and application. With the participating 
states being involved in implementation, this contributed to the development 
of best practices or, in evers’ terms, «interpretive commitments». 107 this 
100 Bodansky, supra n. 5, 711. see generally Bodansky, supra n. 2, 612; Wolfrum, supra n. 8, 2041.
101 see treves, supra n. 10, 172.
102 Id., 173. 
103 see e.g. Tanase vs. Moldova, supra n. 36, paras. 104 et seq.; Frodl vs. Austria, supra n. 40, paras. 22 
et seq. see also the court’s general obligation to give reasons, art. 45 echr. 
104 the court is not formally bound by its previous decisions. For further reference on prece-
dent and system building see M. Jacob, «lawmaking through international adjudication», 
12 German Law Journal (2011) 1005, available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.
php?pageid=11&artid=1351. 
105 even if a rule is indeterminate, general consistency in its application may nonetheless add to its 
perceived legitimacy. as stated by Franck, a rule that is vague may still be seen as quite legitimate 
if its application in given, contested instances, is open to a process that yields specificity. (Franck, 
supra n. 64, 94).
106 see also the court’s increasing reference to soft law standards as evidenced for instance in Sita-
ropoulos vs. Greece, supra n. 66, para. 44. 
107 evers even refers to «a kind of customary law». (evers, supra n. 48, 236, 255).
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soft law 108 provides for detailed yardsticks to assess an electoral process. in 
addition, as missions are generally sent to consecutive elections in the same 
country, country-specific benchmarks are established to compare the electoral 
performance of a country with respect to previous elections.  109 elections are 
thus assessed in a detailed and consistent way which improves the quality of an 
election observation mission’s findings.
the examination of the relation between a decision and its implementa-
tion is under the obvious caveat that compliance by state authorities with a 
judgment can only be a partial guide to the institutions’ substantive/outcome 
legitimacy in case of human rights, where ultimately individuals are the ad-
dressees/beneficiaries. 110 this seems to be even more so the case with regard 
to electoral/political rights, where implementation should serve democratic 
self-rule including the possible replacement of authoritarian regimes (which 
might oppose the implementation of a decision). thus, the «concerned com-
munity» refers to, most evidently in case of political rights, individuals. ac-
cordingly, special focus will be laid on the efficiency of the institutions’ means 
to further compliance.
When it comes to the relation between a decision and its implementa-
tion, the ecthr’s means are limited. indeed, a state is obliged to implement 
the court’s judgments in accordance with article 46 echr. however, the 
effective implementation of electoral standards with respect to a particular 
election is, at first, prevented by the ex post-character of the court’s judg-
ments and the long time-span between the filing of an application and the 
court’s decision. 111 to exemplify, the Yumak and Sadak vs Turkey case, which 
108 existing commitments, supra n. 58. the document was drafted by a group of international law 
experts with experience in electoral and human rights practices in the West as well as the cis 
and the states of the former Yugoslavia and was also endorsed by the permanent council. (pc/
dec 509, 5 december 2002).
109 For many, see e.g. the report of the odihr election assessment mission to uzbekistan 2009 
which comments on the country’s electoral performance by comparing it to previous recom-
mendations made in the report on the 2004 parliamentary elections and the 2005 assessment of 
the country’s legal framework (osce/odihr election assessment, Final report, republic of 
uzbekistan, parliamentary elections 27 december 2009, 7 april 2010, 6, http://www.osce.org/
documents/odihr-el/2010/04/43367_en.pdf.) (For a general discussion, see c. Binder, «Mögli-
chkeiten und Grenzen der Wahlbeobachtung in unsicheren demokratien am Beispiel usbeki-
stans», 4 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (2010) 418.
110 see Bodansky, supra n. 5, referring to the increased importance of non state addressees.
111 see treves, supra n. 10, 173.
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was brought with respect to the 2002 turkish parliamentary elections, was 
not decided until after the 2007 elections. 112 the court’s judgments there-
fore seem most useful to addressing specific insufficiencies in a state’s regula-
tory framework governing an election on a long-term basis. in addition, the 
court’s tools for furthering the implementation of electoral standards are nec-
essarily reduced. the committee of Ministers monitors the execution of the 
court’s judgments. the publication of the compliance records of individual 
states on the council of europe’s website and the increase of the committee 
of Minister’s supervisory powers with the entry into force of the protocol 
no. 14 –the committee may now re-refer cases of non-compliance to the 
ecthr– 113 exercises considerable pressure on states to abide by judgments. 
still, as a judicial institution, the court does not have the means to support or 
technically assist a state in remedying criticized insufficiencies in its electoral 
framework 114. in practice, the states’ compliance with the judgments of the 
ecthr seems mixed: Most states abided by the court’s judgments or at least 
indicated their willingness to do so. 115 in some cases, however, one has been 
faced with delays in implementation, 116 and other countries failed to provide 
the relevant information on the status of compliance to the committee of 
Ministers. 117
112 Wolfrum, supra n. 8, 2041: another aspect of substantive legitimacy may be efficiency; although, 
as argued by Wolfrum, this should not be overrated. 
113 art. 46.4 echr.
114 in fact, the council of europe’s venice commission gives legal opinions –sometimes together 
with odihr– on a country’s electoral framework and adopts recommendations. (see e.g. the 
venice commission-osce/odihr Joint opinion on the draft law on amendments and 
supplements to the law on election of councillors and of Members of parliament of Monte-
negro as amended through July 2006, 3 and 4 June 2010, http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2010/
cdl-ad(2010)023-e.asp).
115 see generally the status of compliance and the execution of judgments, council of europe, su-
pervision of execution. implementation of Judgments of the european court of human rights, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/.
116 For example, as of august 2011 the uK had not implemented the required legislative changes 
concerning prisoners’ voting rights in the follow-up to Hirst in 2004. (supervision of execution. 
implementation of Judgments of the european court of human rights, 74025/01 hirst no. 2, 
Judgment of 06/10/2005 – Grand chamber. interim resolution cM/resdh(2009)160; see also 
Greens and M.T. vs. UK, supra n. 39).
117 For instance, as of august 2011 the committee of Ministers was still waiting for information 
by latvia of how the country intended to implement the court’s Adamsons Judgment of 2008 
as regards the required legislative changes and the applicant’s possibility to stand for elections). 
(supervision of execution. implementation of Judgments of the european court, http://www.
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odihr’s assessments of elections (e.g., preliminary statement, final re-
port) are not legally binding, although osce participating states have politi-
cally committed themselves to follow-up on odihr’s recommendations in 
relevant osce documents. 118 as stated, election missions exercise considerable 
political pressure on states to hold elections in accordance with international 
standards through the publication of their assessments. the follow-up in the 
osce permanent council concerning the implementation of the findings 
of a mission was, however, criticized for being weak and insufficient, 119 which 
makes odihr’s effectiveness depend on the political will of states and gov-
ernments. 120 in fact, the implementation of electoral standards is most effective 
in states that are willing to improve their electoral record, as the observers’ 
reports provide for recommendations of how to tackle detected deficiencies. in 
addition, odihr, in some cases, also technically assists states in the follow-up 
of a mission. 121 the positive potential of this cooperative implementation in 
exchange and dialogue with the country concerned should be enhanced 122 by 
systematically introducing a post-election dialogue with states after an obser-
vation mission. 123 still, the country’s motivation remains vital to what extent 
odihr’s recommendations are implemented; in practice, not only the political 
but also the geo-political situation of a country seems decisive. a study from 
2001 on electoral trends in countries where odihr had observed elections 
saw the most progress in improving electoral standards being made in central/
coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/reports/pendingcases_en.asp?casetitleornumber=ada
msons&statecode=&sectioncode=).
118 see istanbul summit, supra n. 55.
119 see e.g. odihr common responsibility, supra n. 84, para. 147. in this sense generally Binder, 
supra n. 57, 157. 
120 see e.g. H. Balian, «ten Years of international election assistance and observation», 12 Hel-
sinki Monitor (2001) 197, 201.
121 see e.g. odihr common responsibility, supra n. 84, paras. 148 and 149. also, various elec-
tion observation reports directly refer to the possibility of electoral assistance. (see for instance 
the osce/odihr, Final report, russian Federation, presidential election, 14 March 2004, 
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/06/3033_en.pdf, 2; for further information on 
election assistance see odihr’s website, http://www.osce.org/odihr/?page=elections&div=assi
stance. see Binder, supra n. 57, 151 et seq. for further reference.
122 see e.g. 2003 Maastricht Ministerial council, tasking odihr to «consider ways to improve 
the effectiveness of its assistance to participating states in following up [its own] recommenda-
tions.» (osce, 11th Meeting of the Ministerial council, Maastricht, 1 and 2 december 2003, 
decision no 5/03, 81). 
123 see e.g. odihr common responsibility, supra n. 84, paras. 145 et seq on follow up and post 
electoral dialogue. 
Christina Binder
459 anuario español de derecho internacional / vol. 27 / 2011
vista anterior
eastern europe, slow but steady improvements in the Balkans, limited progress 
in the caucasus, and found the most challenging situation in central asia. 124
3.3. Appreciation
this very comprised appraisal indicates that in cases of both institu-
tions’ development and implementation of electoral standards procedural and 
outcome related aspects of legitimacy complement the somehow deficient 
legitimacy derived from state consent. the ecthr’s and odihr’s activi-
ties are governed by considerable procedural safeguards aiming at impartial 
and balanced decisions. likewise, the quality and consistency of reasoning/
assessment legitimate, in principle, the exercise of their authority. 125 these 
procedural and substantive dimensions of legitimacy are important to guide 
the ecthr’s development of the indeterminate electoral standards of article 
3 of the 1st p to the echr as well as odihr’s activities, within its broad 
mandate. this is particularly crucial for international action in areas as sensi-
tive as domestic electoral processes. For odihr, 126 a continuous emphasis 
and strengthening of these additional legitimacy dimensions seems vital also 
in response to russia’s and other cis states’ criticisms, and their allegations 
of its «unchecked autonomy», 127 which, from another perspective, may also 
be viewed as attempts to de-legitimize the institution after odihr had pro-
duced critical reports on the quality of their electoral processes. 128
124 see Balian, supra n. 120, 202 et seq. For similar findings see the 2010 analysis of regional trends 
by Freedom house. (Freedom house/a.puddington, «Freedom in the World 2010: erosion of 
Freedom intensifies», survey, http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw10/FiW_2010_over-
view_essay.pdf, 7 et seq.) For south-eastern europe more generally on democracy building 
see also s. richter, «how effective is the osce’s promotion of democracy? analytical con-
siderations of the effectiveness of the long-term Missions in south-eastern europe», OSCE 
Yearbook 2008, 191.
125 When the legal reasoning is poor, dissenting opinions are a strong tool to highlight such defi-
ciencies. (see e.g. the Joint dissenting opinion to Hirst, supra n. 45).
126 see odihr common responsibility, supra n. 84. For general criticism on international organi-
sations’ «hidden agendas» see e.g. M. ottaway, «should elections Be the criterion of democ-
ratization in africa?», 145 CSIS Africa Notes (1993) 1, 3; r. abrahamsen, Disciplining Democracy: 
Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa (2000).
127 Supra n. 63.
128 russia had started to particularly oppose odihr after the institution had strongly criticized 
russia’s 2003 parliamentary elections and also other countres’ criticism seems to have been 
fuelled by the so-called «colour revolutions». (evers, supra n. 48, 235). 
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still, a comparison of the development and implementation of electoral 
standards from procedural and outcome-related legitimacy perspectives evi-
dences divergences in the institutions’ strengths. the ecthr’s judicial char-
acter and its interpretative technique of system building by informal prec-
edent and standard setting by comparing the legal orders of state parties, 
seem to particularly legitimate the court for the identification of evolving 
electoral standards. While formally the court’s judgments are only binding 
on the parties to a dispute, 129 they are nome generally a strong indication as 
to the relevant state of law. however, these standards based on the detection 
of a common european standard have to be necessarily broad. 130 if not, the 
court will be reproached for having «legislated» as was the case in Hirst vs. 
UK. More generally, the inevitably wide standards reflect the ecthr’s dif-
ficult position as an international court that must involve itself in matters as 
delicate as the electoral arrangements of state parties. Judge levits called this 
the court’s «dilemma» observing that, «on the one hand, it is the court’s task 
to protect the electoral rights of individuals; but, on the other hand, it should 
not overstep the limits of its explicit and implicit legitimacy and try to rule 
instead of the people on the constitutional order which this people creates for 
itself.» 131 Because the court is, in principle, limited to assessing only whether 
there has been a violation, this «dilemma» is exacerbated by the binding and 
binary character of the court’s decisions. 132
inversely, the comparative advantage of election observation missions is 
their «softer» way of standard setting. the concretisation of electoral stand-
ards in the missions’ reports is based on an extensive set of «soft law» docu-
ments and best practices. the ample possibilities of contextualisation (e.g., 
by explaining the non-compliance with electoral standards against the back-
129 art. 46 echr.
130 see also Golubok’s «two layers of protection», distinguishing between the ecthr’s function 
of safeguarding the «core» of electoral rights and a more general body of soft law developed by 
other bodies of the council of europe such as the venice commission. (Golubok, supra n. 27, 
390).
131 Judge levis, dissenting opinion in Zdanoka (chamber judgment), para 17.
132 in Zdanoka vs. Latvia and Yumak and Sadak vs. Turkey, the ecthr resorted to an additional 
means: While not establishing a violation, it nevertheless signalled in its reasoning that the laws 
in place were unsatisfactory and in need for amendment. (Zdanoka vs. Latvia, supra n. 36, para. 
135; Yumak and Sadak vs. Turkey, supra n. 87, para. 147). see harris et al. supra n. 27, 724, 728 et 
seq. for a discussion of the cases.
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ground of a specific country’s situation) 133 and the non-binding nature of their 
recommendations seem particularly adequate to accommodate the need for 
unified international standards with the diversity of different states’ electoral 
systems at domestic level.
concerning the implementation of electoral standards, factors such as 
long delays until a decision is rendered and the ecthr’s limited means to 
support states in the implementation of a judgment hamper the court’s ac-
tion. in addition, because the court is limited to the grounds on which the ap-
plication is brought, it will only deal with the subject of the alleged violation, 
rather than more generally addressing the adequacy of a country’s electoral 
framework.
conversely, odihr’s reports assess the entirety of a country’s electoral 
process and issue recommendations on the legal, electoral, political, or media-
related aspects of an election. these provide an excellent basis for embarking 
on a post-election dialogue with the country concerned and relevant state au-
thorities, but also including non-actors such as political parties, civil society, the 
media, or women’s candidates. the flexibility of this cooperation-based compli-
ance model pushes for the implementation of international electoral standards, 
all while allowing for diversity at national level. it seems most appropriate to 
tackle deficiencies in the multilayered domestic electoral processes with a vari-
ety of stakeholders involved. Given their potential, odihr should increase and 
broaden its activities in the follow-up of observation missions. 134
Finally, to further enhance their legitimacy, both institutions could 
consider increasing mutual reliance and cross-referencing. For example, 
references to the ecthr’s judgments –as for example can be found in the 
election observation mission reports on uK and austria– improved the au-
thority of odihr’s findings 135. also, the ecthr could, if available, draw in 
its reasoning on the extensive documentation provided in election observa-
tion reports, 136 which would facilitate its consideration of the facts 137. Given 
133 see e.g. odihr report on uzbekistan, supra n. 109. 
134 see also odihr common responsibility, supra n. 84.
135 see e.g. the reference to Frodl in the osce/odihr eaM Final report on austria presidential 
election, 25 april 2010, 4 and the reference to Hirst in the osce/odihr eaM Final report 
on the united Kingdom General election, 6 May 2010, 6.
136 in accordance with art. 38 echr, the court may engage in investigations ex officio.
137 the ecthr draws considerably on soft law instruments. see e.g. Tanase vs. Moldova, where the 
court referred in its analysis of the 2008 Moldovan electoral reform to the council of europe’s 
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the growing number of cases on the right to free elections delivered by the 
ecthr, and the diversification of countries to which odihr election obser-
vation and assessment missions are deployed, now also including consolidated 
democracies, there seems to be ample room for future interaction.
4. concluding remarks
so, anything new since the end of the cold War? it was argued here that 
«international law has gone domestic» with respect to domestic electoral pro-
cesses in the period post-1989 and has started to rule also in internal affairs, at 
least at the european regional level.
still, the above appraisal shows the challenges of such expansion of inter-
national law in an area as delicate as domestic electoral processes and consti-
tutional orders. the inherent tension and sensitive task to accommodate (uni-
fied) international standards with diversity at national level, in the very core of 
a state’s functioning, is particularly evident in electoral matters, with different 
states’ electoral systems being a very direct expression of the specific historic, 
cultural, legal, social, and political conditions of a state. the procedural- and 
outcome-related legitimacy dimensions bolstering the ecthr’s and odihr 
election observation missions’ development and implementation of interna-
tional standards are important, but may only contribute to ease this tension.
What is more, elections are an essential but not a sufficient condition for 
genuine democracy. 138 democratic governance is a complex and difficult con-
cept, in need of strong institutions, participation and accountability mecha-
nisms, including elements such as parliamentary processes, justice, the rule of 
law, human rights, transparency, access to information, and accountable and 
commission against racism and intolerance, the venice commission and the council of eu-
rope parliamentary assembly’s reactions to Moldova’s legislative changes (Tanase vs. Moldova, 
supra n. 36, paras. 45 et seq.). see Golubok on the role of soft law instruments in the ecthr’s 
jurisprudence on the right to free elections. (Golubok, supra n. 27, 386 et seq.).
138 G. o’donnell/J.v. cullellet al. (eds.), The Quality of Democracy. Theory and Applications (2004); 
l. diamond/l.Morlino, Assessing the Quality of Democracy (2005). see also relevant un General 
assembly resolutions, e.g. un Ga res 55/96, «promoting and consolidating democracy», 
un doc. a/res/55/96, calling on states to take action in a wide range of areas including hu-
man rights, electoral systems, the rule of law or civil society participation. see c. pippan, supra 
n. 16, 15, for further reference. 
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effective public administration. 139 an effective realisation of electoral stand-
ards is thus vital, but not enough for true democratic governance. the elec-
toral standards discussed here address the vertical relation between citizens and 
their governments, the possibility of a state’s people to hold its government 
accountable through elections. a next step towards the realisation of demo-
cratic governance would be to deal with horizontal accountability, including 
the separation of powers, the relationship between legislative and executive, 
the independence of the judiciary, or the civilian control of the security sec-
tor. Given their complexity, the development of international standards in this 
area is still at an embryonic stage. 140 nonetheless, in view of the increasing 
expansion of international law into the domestic arena over the past two dec-
ades, one may wonder whether the legitimacy of international standards on 
the horizontal accountability of democratic governance will be the topic of a 
next article in the Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional: perhaps in 2021?
139 see undeF, «situating the un democracy Fund in the Global arena. the elements of de-
mocracy», http://www.un.org/democracyfund/Xsituatingdemocracy.htm. in fact, the Freedom 
house survey 2010 concluded that: «... despite the vote-rigging, fraud, and other manipulations 
that occurred in a number of countries in 2009, the global picture over the last five years sug-
gests that governments are more likely to permit relatively honest elections than to allow an 
uncensored press, a robust civil society, and an independent judiciary.» (Freedom house, supra 
n. 124, 3).
140 see for a first appraisal dri, «discussing international standards for democratic Govern-
ance. a preliminary research report», september 2007, http://www.democracy-reporting.org/
standards.html. as to international standards for democratic legislatures, see ndi, «toward the 
development of international standards for democratic legislatures», January 2007. see also 
osce/odihr propositions for further commitments by osce participating states as regards 
the necessary components of genuine democratic government, including separation of powers, 
clarification of the role of the executive branch, independence of the judiciary and legislative 
transparency and efficiency. (odihr common responsibility, supra n. 84).

